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Abstract
This paper offers a unified analytical treatment of Marx’s theory of ground-rent, build-
ing on the analysis that is available in Volume Three of Capital. Since ground-rent
is a transformation of surplus profit generated in agriculture, the main argument is
developed in two steps. In the first step, I derive results on the existence of surplus
profit in capitalist agriculture in the absence of landed property. In the second step,
I used these results on surplus profit to arrive at the total ground-rent that is appro-
priated by the owners of land, and also decompose it into the three components that
Marx highlighted: absolute rent, differential rent I, and differential rent II. I argue that
the power of Marx’s analysis lies in the fact that it can be generalised far beyond the
domain of agriculture, which he had analysed, and can illuminate the emergence of
rent in any system of capitalist commodity production that uses privately owned non-
produced resources that is limited in quantity. Hence, Marx’s analysis of ground-rent
can be used to investigate many interesting issues in contemporary capitalism.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Capitalist commodity production frequently relies on the use of non-produced resources.
While the use of land, a key non-produced resource, for capitalist agricultural production
is a prominent example, there are many other industries where non-produced resources are
used. In the mining industry, where the particular mineral extracted is the commodity sold
on the market, the ground in which the mine shaft is located is the non-produced resource.
In much the same way, in the production of oil or natural gas, the ground beneath which
the oil or natural gas is present, is the relevant non-produced resource. As another example,
consider the part of the tourism industry that arrange tours to natural locations. In this
case, the tourist service is the commodity and the forest, river, lake or mountain, whichever
is the relevant natural object, is the non-produced resource used in the production of the
commodity. As a last case, consider the housing industry. Here the produced commodity
sold on the market is the house or apartment - residential or commercial - complex and the
land on which these buildings are constructed is the non-produced resource. In each of these
examples, and they could be multiplied, if the non-produced resource is privately owned, and
is limited in quantity then its owner appropriates an income stream that we call capitalist
rent (or, following Marx, ground-rent).
The existence of non-produced resources like land that are used in capitalist commodity
production and the associated income stream that accrues to owners of the resource, rent,
creates interesting problems for Marxist political economy. Non-produced resources, by
definition, are not created by human labour. Hence they do not have value in the Marxian
sense.1 But in all capitalist economies, markets for many non-produced resources exist,
where these are regularly bought and sold. Hence, non-produced resources have prices, even
though they have no value. How does Marxist political economy explain the existence of
items that have no value, and yet have prices?
The keys to answering this interesting question are the existence of capitalist rent and
interest. Capitalist rent is the income stream that is appropriated by the owner of the non-
produced resource per unit of time, for instance a year, for allowing use of the resource.
Interest is the income stream accruing to owners of money capital per unit of time, for
instance a year, for allowing the use of the money capital. For, once a financial system is
in existence and a market interest rate, i.e. interest payment per unit of money borrowed,
has emerged, any income stream, i.e. sums of money distributed over future periods, can be
valued or ‘capitalized’.
The capitalized value of an income stream is the sum of the discounted income stream.
The discounted value of an amount of money x, say, t years in the future, is x/ (1 + i)t, where
i is the annual market interest rate. Thus, the capitalised value of an income stream is the
sum of discounted values of all amounts that comprise the income stream. For instance,
1The value of a commodity is the amount of socially necessary abstract labour required to produce, and
hence reproduce, the commodity. Marx presents his understanding of the labour theory of value in Part I of
the Volume One of Capital. For details see Marx (1992, pp.126–163.).
2
consider a stream of money income that consists of $1000 per year, for every year into the
indefinite future. If the market interest rate is 10% per year, the capitalized value of the
income stream is $10000. This is because the infinite sum of the discounted income stream
is 10000.2 A more intuitive way to understand the capitalized value of an income stream is
to see it as the principal, which would, in turn, generate the stream of money incomes under
consideration as its annual interest income, given the market interest rate. Returning to our
example, we can see that the capitalized value in question must be $10000. This is because
the annual interest payment on a sum of $10000 is $1000 when the market interest rate is
10% per year.
The principle of capitalization is relevant in this context because it allows us to derive
a price of a non-produced resource as follows: the price of a non-produced resource is the
capitalized value of the stream of rent payments that is entailed by ownership of any non-
produced resource. For instance, using the example of the previous paragraph, if the rent
on a plot of land is $1000 per year and the market interest rate is 10% per year, then the
price of the plot of land would be $10000. While this provides us with a consistent Marxist
theory for pricing non-produced resources and helps explain the puzzle of items with price
but no value, it relies on a prior explanation of the phenomenon of capitalist rent. Such an
explanation is presented by Marx as the theory of ground-rent in Volume Three of Capital.
1.2 The Place of Rent in Das Kapital
In Capital, Marx offers a penetrating, critical analysis of the structure and long term dy-
namics of the capitalist mode of production. The analysis and presentation in Capital is
organized into three volumes and conducted at two primary levels of abstraction. Volumes
One and Two operate at the level of what Marx calls ‘capital in general’, where competi-
tion between capitalists is abstracted from. Thus these two volumes analyse the interaction
between capital and labour at the aggregate level. In Volume One of Captial, Marx anal-
yses the process of production of capital, i.e. the processes of the generation of surplus
value through the exploitation of labour, and the accumulation of surplus value to create
additional capital. The analysis in Volume One implicitly assumes that commodities can
be sold at prices necessary to realise the full value and hence surplus value embedded in
them. In Volume Two Marx returns to an analysis of the issues related to the realisation of
surplus value through the circulation of capital at the aggregate level. In Volume three of
Capital, the analysis moves to a lower level of abstraction and analyses the distribution and
re-distribution of surplus value. Competition between capitalists, and bargaining between
capitalists and resource owners, e.g. owners of land, are the mechanisms through which the
surplus value generated in production and realised through sale - analysed in Volumes One
and Two - are distributed and redistributed in capitalist economies.3
In Volume Three, Marx’s discussion of the distribution of surplus value proceeds in two
analytically separate steps. In the first step, the total surplus value generated in production
2Note that
∑∞
i=1
{
1000/(1 + 0.1)i
}
= (1000/0.1) = 10000.
3For a discussion of the structure and content of Capital, see Basu (2017).
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is distributed across different sectors through the competition between ‘industrial’ capitals.4
In the second step, some of the surplus value appropriated by ‘industrial’ capital, analysed
in the first step, is further redistributed to other fractions of the ruling class as commercial
profit, ground-rent and interest.
The capitalist who produces surplus-value, i.e. who extracts unpaid labour di-
rectly from the workers and fixes it in commodities, is admittedly the first ap-
propriator of his surplus-value, but he is by no means its ultimate proprietor.
He has to share it afterwards with capitalists who fulfil other functions in social
reproduction taken as a whole, with the owner of the land, and with yet other
people. Surplus-value is therefore split up into various parts. Its fragments fall
to various categories of person, and take on various mutually independent forms,
such as profit, interest, gains made through trade, ground rent, etc. (Marx, 1992,
709).
1.3 The Contribution of this Paper
This paper makes three contributions. First, this paper makes explicit an argument that
is implicitly present in Volume Three of Capital, viz., that the analysis of ground-rent is
applicable far beyond the domain of capitalist agricultural production. It can be applied to
understand the income stream appropriated by owners of all privately owned non-produced
resources, in the form of rent, when that resource is used in any form of capitalist commodity
production. Thus, industries like fishing, mining, oil and natural gas, housing and real estate,
tourism can be brought into the ambit of this analysis. To illustrate this point, I apply Marx’s
theory of ground-rent, as presented in this paper, to think about some issues that are relevant
to an understanding of contemporary capitalism.
Second, it provides a consistent, unified, analytical framework to think about the ‘frag-
ment’ of surplus value known as ground-rent. While a voluminous literature has studied
various issues analysed by Marx in Volume One of capital - like abstract labour, the labour
process, the valorisation process, capital accumulation and the reserve army of labour - issues
dealt with in Volumes Two and Three of Capital have been relatively neglected. While some
attention has been devoted to volume two of capital following the pioneering work by Duncan
Foley on the circuit of capital (Foley, 1982), the main issues discussed with regard to volume
three of Capital have been the so-called transformation problem - which really took off with
the Sraffa-based critique of the early 1970s (Steedman, 1977) - and the law of the tendential
fall of the rate of profit - which drew lot of scholarly attention since the publication of the
4The term ‘industrial capital’ should be understood broadly as referring to capital that is involved in the
production of commodities, which can be goods or services. It does not refer to industrial production only.
Marx uses this term to distinguish capital involved in production from ‘merchant capital’, which is involved
in the purchase and sale of commodities and ‘usurious capital’, which is involved in lending and borrowing
of money. Both these forms of capital predate ‘industrial capital’ and are characterized by the fact that
they appropriate value through unequal exchange but do not organize the production of commodities and
the concomitant generation of surplus value.
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Okishio theorem (Okishio, 1963). The processes of the distribution of surplus value in the
form of interest, ground-rent and commercial profit has not been studied as extensively as
the other issues. By providing an analysis of ground-rent, this paper tries to partly fill this
lacuna.
The specific way in which I try to fill this lacuna also needs to be highlighted. While
Eaton (1963), Mandel (1968), Foley (1986) and Fine (2006) offer insightful analyses of Marx’s
theory of ground-rent, this paper takes the discussion forward by formalising Marx’s key
ideas on ground-rent. While Marx used a series of examples in Volume Three of Capital
to illustrate his arguments, and later authors followed him in presenting arguments mostly
with the help of examples, there is a disadvantage in using such a methodology. Examples
can illustrate quantitative arguments, but they cannot establish them. Specific examples are
driven by specific assumptions, and so it is not possible to understand the general logic of
the argument with the help of examples only. A formal, mathematical framework, on the
other hand, can help us grasp general arguments. Such a framework also helps us identify
the specific conditions under which Marx’s insights about ground-rent are valid and the
situations where Marx’s analysis requires modifications and amendments.5
But a formal, mathematical presentation has the disadvantage that it reduces accessibility
significantly. Hence, to make the argument accessible to a broader audience as also to
highlight its full generality through a mathematical presentation, in this paper I adopt a
strategy of using a mix of formal and non-technical modes of presentation. I present the
overall argument in a primarily non-technical manner, with the help of examples, in the
main text and provide a full mathematical treatment in the Appendix.
Third, it argues that a key assumption in Marx’s analysis, viz., that the organic compo-
sition of capital in agriculture is lower than the economy-wide average organic composition
can be relaxed. I show the role of this assumption in Marx’s analysis and also demonstrate
that the analysis of ground-rent can be carried out without relying on this assumption. This
increases the applicability of the analysis because many of the industries that currently use
non-produced resources, including agriculture in advanced capitalist countries, no longer
have a lower than average organic composition of capital. Since one of the arguments of
this paper is that rent incomes, and phenomena related to rent, in such industries can be
explained by Marx’s theory of ground-rent, it is important to develop the argument without
relying on the assumption of lower than average organic composition of capital.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I discuss the process of redistri-
bution of surplus value and the emergence of the average rate of profit; this will provide the
backdrop to the analysis of ground-rent in subsequent sections. In section 3, I present Marx’s
analysis of ground-rent and illustrate the argument with three examples. In section 4, I argue
why Marx’s analysis of ground-rent is relevant for understanding many features of contem-
porary capitalism and apply it to some issues from contemporary capitalism. I conclude the
5The discussion of rent in volume three of Capital shows that Marx was clearly aware of three types
of ground-rent: (a) rent arising from monopoly price (Marx, 1993, pp. 898-899); (b) differential rent; and
(c) absolute rent. While Marx briefly discusses the issue of rent that depends on monopoly price (for an
illuminating example of a vineyard, see Marx (1993, pp. 910)), he devotes the bulk of the analysis to
differential and absolute rent. In this paper, I follow Marx and only discuss differential and absolute rent.
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discussion in section 5 with some ideas about extensions and future research directions. Ap-
pendix A presents the whole argument in mathematical form, and Appendix B discusses an
example from chapter 44 in Volume Three of Capital where Marx demonstrates, incorrectly
in my opinion, that differential rent of the second variety can arise on the worst plot of land.
2 Redistribution of Surplus Value and Surplus Profit
Let me briefly recapitulate the argument about the emergence of prices of production to
create the background for the analysis of ground-rent. Natural differences in the conditions
and technologies of production across different sectors of the economy implies variations in
the organic composition of capital (OCC), i.e. the ratio of constant capital and variable
capital used in production varies across sectors.6 Some sectors like machine production use
lot more constant capital per unit of variable capital than the economy-wide average; on the
other hand, some service sectors like the restaurant industry use much less constant capital
per unit of variable capital than the average OCC for the whole economy.
Sectors with lower than the economy-wide average OCC exploit more labour-power per
unit of invested capital than the social average. Hence, if the rate of exploitation is the same
across all sectors of production, then the sectors with lower than average OCC generate
more surplus value per unit of capital invested than the corresponding average in the whole
economy. Using a variation of Marx’s terminology, I will refer to the difference between
the two as ‘surplus profit’ per unit of invested capital. In an analogous manner, sectors
with higher than average OCC generate lower amounts of surplus value per unit of invested
capital than the economy-wide average, i.e. they generate, again using a variation in Marx’s
terminology, ‘deficit profit’ per unit of invested capital. If each sector realized the surplus
value it generated, then sectors with lower than average OCC would realize rates of profit
on invested capital that are higher than the economy-wide average. Similarly, sectors with
higher than average OCC would realize rates of profit on invested capital that are lower
than the economy-wide average. But different rates of profit across different sectors of the
economy cannot be a situation of long term equilibrium.
Sectors with lower than average OCC, which generate ‘surplus profit’, would attract
capital; and sectors with higher than average OCC, which generate ‘deficit profit’, would
lose capital. This movement of capital across sectors would continue until all sectors that
participate in this process realize an average rate of profit on their invested capital. The
prices of commodities which ensure the average rate of profit for each sector are called the
prices of production. For instance, if the constant and variable capital used per unit of a
commodity is denoted by c and v, and the average of profit in the economy is denoted by r¯,
then the price of production for the commodity, p, is given by p = (c+ v) (1 + r¯).
There are two important features of this process of the emergence of prices of production
and an average rate of profit that require our attention. First, the emergence of prices of
6Constant capital is the sum of money used to purchase the non-labour inputs, and variable capital is
the sum of money used to purchase the labour input, into capitalist commodity production (Marx, 1992,
Chapter 8).
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production and the average rate of profit is a process of redistribution of the total surplus
value created in production. While surplus value flows away from the lower than average
OCC sectors, the higher than average OCC sectors gain surplus value. It is only then that all
sectors can earn the same (average) rate of profit on invested capital. Second, the mechanism
through which prices of production emerges (in the long run) is the free mobility of capital
across sectors in search of higher rates of profit. If there are factors that impede the free
mobility of capital, then it is possible for some sectors with lower than average OCC to
appropriate the total surplus profit they generate. This is the entry point to the analysis of
ground-rent in agriculture.
Agricultural production under capitalist relations of production in nineteenth century
Europe had two important characteristics. First, there was a limited quantity of land that
can be used for agricultural production. Second, the land that could be used for agricultural
production was under private ownership. Marx refers to this as the ‘monopoly of landed
property’ and clarifies the precise sense of this ‘monopoly’
Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of dispos-
ing of particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to
the exclusion of all others (Marx, 1993, pp. 752)
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that while Marx explicitly referred to
capitalist agricultural production with a limited quantity of land for the analysis of ground-
rent, it can be applied to the case of any capitalist commodity production that uses some
non-produced resource which is limited in quantity. Hence, for the analysis in this paper, I
will use the term ‘agriculture’ to refer to capitalist commodity production that uses a generic
non-produced resource that is limited in quantity, the latter being referred to as ‘land’, and
the term ‘monopoly of landed property’, to refer to private ownership of ‘land’.
The monopoly of landed property implies that owners can legally prevent others from
accessing or using the land. Under capitalist relations of production, these two factors -
limited quantity and private ownership of the non-produced resource - come together to
create impediments to the free movement of capital into agriculture. That creates the basis
for the emergence of rent. This is because once all the available land has been appropriated
as private property, no more land would be freely available for capital investment. In such
a situation, new capital can be invested into agricultural production, which crucially uses
land, only by displacing some existing capitalists. Therefore, the fixed quantity of privately
owned land becomes a barrier to the mobility of capital into the agricultural sector. Since
capital cannot freely enter into agriculture, the surplus value created in agriculture does
not participate in the economy-wide process of redistribution of surplus value. This implies
that the ‘surplus profit’ generated by capital invested in agriculture (because agricultural
production has an OCC that is lower than the economy wide average), i.e. the profit over and
above what is implied by the economy-wide average rate of profit, can remain in agriculture.
Depending on the exact structure of private ownership of agricultural land, the surplus
profit in agriculture can take two forms. First, if the land used for agricultural production
is owned by the capitalist-farmers (the agents who organise production), then the ‘surplus
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profit’ accrues to the capitalist-farmers as supernormal profits. Second, if monopoly of own-
ership of the land rests with the class of landowners - a situation Marx refers to as ‘landed
property’ - then the ‘surplus profit’ is appropriated by landowners as ground-rent.7 This is
referred to by Marx as the transformation of surplus profit into ground-rent.8
Landed property operates as an absolute barrier only in as much as any permis-
sion to use land, as a field of investment for capital, enables the landowner to
extract a tribute. (Marx, 1993, 899).
In volume three of Capital, Marx analyses the second structure of private ownership of
agricultural land, i.e. landed property, to understand the emergence of ground-rent (Marx,
1993, pp. 755-756). But it is analytically convenient to first analyse the case of capitalist
agriculture without landed property, i.e. where land is owned by the capitalist-farmers them-
selves. This structure of private property in land allows us to see clearly the generation of
surplus profit. This allows us, in the next step of the analysis, to easily grasp the phenomenon
of ground-rent as the appropriation of the surplus profit by the class of landowners. This
drives home the point that ground-rent is a transformation of surplus profit in the sense that
(a) surplus profit can exist even in the absence of landed property, as Marx had indicated by
referring to its ‘natural basis’ and as the analysis of capitalist farming without landed prop-
erty shows, and (b) ground-rent arises only under certain property relations viz., monopoly
of ownership of land by the class of landlords. The second point dispels any illusions about
ground-rent as arising from some natural property of the land.
3 Surplus Profit and Ground-Rent in Agriculture
3.1 Surplus Profit without Landed Property
Let us begin the analysis by considering capitalist agricultural production without landed
property, i.e. a situation where the plots of agricultural land are owned by the capitalist
farmers themselves. Plots of land used for agricultural production naturally vary by their
quality. This variation arises from natural differences in fertility and location (Marx, 1993,
pp. 789). Differences in the quality of land give rise to differences in their productivity,
7Here the term ‘monopoly’ is used to refer to private ownership of land by the class of landlords. It has
nothing to do with the structure of the market for the agricultural commodity, i.e. whether it is competitive
or monopolistic. As I notes earlier, Marx is aware of the possibility of rent due to ‘monopoly’ price (in the
sense of the market structure being monopolistic), but that is not the object of analysis in volume three of
Capital. So, when I use the term ‘monopoly’ it will only be in the sense of monopoly of ownership.
8When the land is owned by landowners, there is an additional aspect of the barrier to capital investment.
At the expiration of the lease contract, all the “improvements made to the land fall to the landowner as
his property, as an inseparable accident of the substance, the land” (Marx, 1993, pp. 757). The new lease
would be for a higher amount and so the benefits of the capital investments like irrigation that result in a
permanent improvement of the land would be reaped by the landowner, and not the capitalist-farmer. Hence,
the presence of landed property creates disincentives for capital investments that could lead to permanent
improvements in the quality of land.
8
which, in turn, implies differences in the cost of production per unit of output across the
plots of land. This leads to a hierarchy of rates of profit across plots of land, with the worst
quality plot generating the lowest and the best quality plot generating the highest rate of
profit.
To see the reason for the hierarchy of profit rates, recall that the profit rate is the ratio
of profit income per unit of output and cost of producing a unit of the output, i.e. the
unit cost of production, where profit income per unit of output is the difference between the
price and the unit cost of production. Higher quality of land implies higher productivity,
i.e., higher quantity of output from the same land area, which, in turn, leads to lower unit
cost of production. Hence, the denominator in the definition of the rate of profit is lower
for higher quality plots of land. Since the price of the agricultural commodity is the same
for all producers no matter which plot of land they use, higher productivity translates into
higher profit income per unit of output. Thus, the numerator in the definition of the rate
of profit is higher. Hence, higher quality of land implies higher rates of profit. Thus, the
capitalist-farmer with the worst quality plot of land earns the lowest rate of profit and the
other capitalist-farmers reap higher rates of profit in the same rank order as the quality of
their plots of land.
To make the argument in more precise terms it will be helpful to differentiate the plots
of land, especially the worst plot from the rest. To do so, let us assume that there are
N plots of land, each of which can be labelled with one of the numbers 1, 2, . . . , N . Since
plots of land vary by quality, we can always choose to do the labelling in increasing order of
quality. Thus, plot 1 refers to the worst quality land, plot 2 to the next best quality land,
and so on, with plot N referring to the best quality land. To make an argument about a
generic plot of land, we will identify it with the label i, where i can take any of the following
values: 1, 2, . . . , N . For instance, the rate of profit on plot i will be denoted by ri, where the
subscript tells us that we are referring to plot i.
With this notational scheme, we can express the argument about the hierarchy of profit
rates that we made above as follows: r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r3 . . . ≤ rN , i.e. the rate of profit is the
lowest on the worst quality plot, and increases with the quality of the plots to the the highest
value for the best quality plot. An immediate implication, which will become important in
the discussion of differential rent, is that all plots earn some ‘extra’ profit in relation to the
worst quality plot of land.
If the economy-wide average rate of profit is given by α, then it is useful to compare the
rate of profit generated on a generic plot of land, ri, with this economy-wide average rate of
profit. When a plot of land generates a rate of profit in excess of the economy-wide average
rate of profit, it is said to generate ‘surplus profit’. To pin down the magnitude of the surplus
profit on plot i, let ci and vi denote, respectively, the constant and variable capital used on
that plot of land. Hence, the ‘capital advanced’ on plot i is given by ci + vi, i.e. the sum
of constant capital and variable capital. If the capital advanced on this plot were to earn a
rate of profit ri, then the total profit income would be (ci + vi)× ri, i.e. the product of the
capital advanced and the rate of profit. If, on the other hand, the capital advanced on plot
i were to earn the economy-wide average rate of profit, denoted as α, then the total profit
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income would be (ci + vi) × α. The difference between the two is the ‘surplus profit’, i.e.
profit income over and above what would be implied by the economy-wide average rate of
profit. Hence, if we denote by SPi the surplus profit on plot i, then it is given by
SPi = (ci + vi) ri − (ci + vi)α = (ci + vi)(ri − α). (1)
3.2 Ground-Rent with Landed Property
Let us now turn to analysing capitalist agricultural production in the presence of landed
property, i.e. a situation where the land used for agricultural production is owned by a class
of landowners (that is different from the class of capitalist farmers). Capitalist agricultural
production in the presence of landed property involves three economic agents: the capitalist-
farmer who organizes the production process; the wage-worker who does the actual work of
cultivation; and the landlord who owns the land and rents it out to the capitalist-farmer.
The rental contract between the landlord and the capitalist-farmer involves payment of a
fixed sum of money by the capitalist-farmer to the landowner in return for the permission to
use the plot of land for a fixed period of time (specified in the contract). This sum of money
is called ground-rent.
The presuppositions for the capitalist mode of production [in agriculture] are thus
as follows: the actual cultivators are wage-labourers, employed by a capitalist,
the farmer, who pursues agriculture simply as a particular field of exploitation of
capital, as an investment of his capital in a particular sphere of production. At
certain specified dates, e.g. annually, this capitalist-farmer pays the landowner,
the proprietor of the land he exploits, a contractually fixed sum of money ... for
the permission to employ his capital in this particular field of production. This
sum of money is known as ground-rent, irrespective of whether it is paid for
agricultural land, building land, mines, fisheries, forests, etc. It is paid for the
entire period for which the landowner has contractually rented the land to the
farmer (Marx, 1993, pp. 755-756)
Ground-rent arises from the fact that agricultural land, which is limited in quantity,
is privately owned by the class of landowners. Private ownership of the limited quantity
of land allows the landowners to bargain away a part of the surplus value generated in
agricultural production in lieu of the right to use the land. This is what Marx means by the
‘transformation of surplus profit into ground-rent’.
In quantitative terms, what part of the surplus value can be appropriated by the landown-
ers through bargaining? Landowners can bargain away the whole of the ‘surplus profit’ from
the capitalist-farmers, leaving them with just the amount of surplus value which allows them
to earn a rate of profit on their investment that is equal to the average rate of profit in the
whole non-agricultural sector. If the landlord tries to ask for more, the capitalist-farmer will
not agree because she would be able to earn a higher rate of profit elsewhere in the economy;
if the capitalist-farmer asks for more, the landlord would refuse, and instead offer the land
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to a different capitalist-farmer. The only stable situation would be when the landlord is able
to appropriate the whole of the surplus profit. Hence, in quantitative terms, ground-rent is
the ‘surplus profit’ appropriated by the landowners.
Since ground-rent is surplus profit, we can use the expression for the latter in (1) to
express the former on plot i as
GRi = (ci + vi) ri − (ci + vi)α = (ci + vi)(ri − α), (2)
where GRi denotes the magnitude of ground rent on plot i.
Marx argued that the total ground-rent on any plot of land can be decomposed into three
parts, differential rent of the first variety, differential rent of the second variety and absolute
rent. A little algebraic manipulation shows that this is indeed the case:
GRi = DRIi +DRIIi + AR = DRi + AR (3)
where
DRIi = (ci + vi)(ri − r1)
is differential rent of the first variety,
DRIIi = [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α)
is differential rent of the second variety, and
AR = (c1 + v1)(r1 − α)
is absolute rent, and the sum of DRI and DRII is differential rent (without any prefix)
DRi = DRIi +DRIIi.
Differential rent of the first variety - what Marx refers to as DRI - arises from differences
in the quality of plots of land (Marx, 1993, chapter 39). Differences in the quality of plots of
land imply differences in unit costs of production, so that it leads to differences in the rates
of profit earned, as we have noted above. In concrete terms, this difference is captured by the
difference in the rate of profit on plot i with respect to the rate of profit on the worst plot of
land, r1. Thus, the worst plot of land functions as the benchmark plot for the computation
of DRI. The profit income generated on plot i is given by (ci + vi)ri; if the capital invested
on plot i were to earn the rate of profit earned by the benchmark plot, then the total profit
income generated on the plot would be (ci + vi)r1. The difference between the two is DRIi.
That is why differential rent of the first variety on plot i is given in (2) by (ci + vi)(ri − r1).
Differential rent of the second variety - what Marx refers to as DRII - arises from
differences in the amount of capital invested on different plots of land (Marx, 1993, chapter
41). With the worst plot of land functioning as the benchmark, once again, the difference
in capital invested on plot i is given by [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)]. The surplus profit generated
on the worst plot is (c1 + v1)(r1 − α). If the capital invested on plot i were to generate the
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surplus profit at the same rate, then total surplus profit income would be (ci + vi)(r1 − α).
Hence, the excess surplus profit on plot i that can be attributed to the difference in invested
capital is given by the difference between the two, i.e., [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α). This
is differential rent of the second variety, DRII.
Since the worst plot of land functions as the benchmark for both quality of land and
quantity of capital invested, it can earn neither DRI (which arise from difference in quality
of land) nor DRII (which comes from differences in amounts of capital invested). Does it
mean that the worst plot earns no rent? The answer is a resounding no. As long as landed
property exists, no plot of land, including the worst plot, will be available gratis for use in
commodity production (Marx, 1993, pp. 884–885, 890–891).
Assuming then that demand requires the taking up of new land which is, say,
less fertile than that previously cultivated, will the owner of this land lease it for
nothing just because the market price of its product has risen high enough for
capital investment to pay the farmer the price of production and thus yield him
the customary profit? In no way. The capital investment must yield him a rent.
He leases only when a lease-price can be paid. (Marx, 1993, pp. 891)
The surplus profit that is earned on the worst plot of land is known as absolute rent
(Marx, 1993, chapter 45).9 This explains why the expression for absolute rent on plot i in
(2) is given by (c1 + v1)(r1 − α). An important property of absolute rent is that, for all
plots of land other than the worst plot, it gets added to DRI and DRII to generate the
magnitude of total ground-rent (Marx, 1993, pp. 882–884). This is because each of these
two types of differential rent, DRI and DRII, is computed with reference to the worst plot
of land.10
Since no plot of land can be obtained for free, the magnitude of absolute rent will always
be positive. Moreover, since absolute rent is a component of total ground-rent, it can never
exceed the latter. Since total ground-rent is the sum of absolute rent, DRI and DRII this
means that the sum of DRI and DRII, which we can call differential rent (without any
postfixes), will always be positive. This is an important point because of the possibility for
DRII to be negative. Since there are no restrictions on the amounts of capital invested (or
advanced) on any plot of land, it is not inconceivable that the amount of capital invested
on plot i is lower than the amount invested on plot 1, i.e. (ci + vi) < (c1 + v1). Since
DRIIi = [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α), this will make DRII negative, as long as r1 > α.
But this does not create any problem for Marx’s analysis because we know that the total
differential rent, i.e. the sum of DRI and DRII, will always be positive. Thus, in such a
scenario, i.e. with negative DRII, the magnitude of DRI will be large enough to nullify the
9In chapter 45, Marx refers to the worst plot of land as land of type A; for instance, see Marx (1993, pp.
882).
10The recognition of the existence of absolute rent differentiates the Marxist tradition from the Ricardian
and Sraffian traditions. For Ricardo (1821), and following him for Sraffa (1960), the rent on the worst plot
of land was zero. Marx, and the Marxist tradition, disagrees. The worst plot of land also earns positive
magnitudes of rent, as long as private ownership of land is enforced and there is no free land to be used.
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negative magnitude of DRII. Of course, whether it is probable that (ci + vi) < (c1 + v1) for
any plot i is a question worth thinking about, and I will return to this later.
3.3 Price of the Agricultural Commodity
The magnitude of ground-rent on any plot of land depends, as can be seen from the expression
in (2), on three factors: the economy-wide average rate of profit, α, the capital advanced,
(ci + vi), and the rate of profit generated on the plot, ri. The economy-wide rate of profit
is external to the agricultural sector and can be taken as an exogenous parameter. The
capital advanced is also taken as given, in the sense that the analysis of ground-rent does
not investigate the determinants of the capital advanced on each plot of land. Rather, given
the magnitudes of capital advanced, the analysis computes the magnitude of the ground-rent.
Hence, the focus of the whole analysis is on the third factor: the rate of profit generated on
any plot of land.
We now turn to the crucial question: what determines the rate of profit that is generated
on any plot of land? Recall that the profit rate per unit of the agricultural commodity is
the ratio of profit income per unit of the commodity and the unit cost of production. Profit
income per unit of the commodity is the difference between the price and the unit cost of
production. Hence, the rate of profit depends on the ratio of the price of the commodity
and the unit cost of production. Since the analysis of ground-rent takes the constant and
variable capital as datum, the key factor that determines the rate of profit is the price of
the agricultural commodity. Is there any economic principle that could pin down the actual
market price of the agricultural commodity?
The first thing to note is that the economic principle underlying the formation of long
run prices of production will not be of help. Since there are barriers to the movement of
capital in agriculture - due to the private ownership of a fixed and finite quantity of land -
the surplus value generated in capitalist agricultural production does not participate in the
economy-wide redistribution of surplus value. Hence agricultural commodities do not sell at
the price of production even in the long run.11 Since prices of production do not emerge in
the market for agricultural commodities in the long run, we need an alternative economic
principle to determine the long run price of the agricultural commodity.
Marx’s analysis in Volume Three of Capital offers one important principle for the determi-
nation of the agricultural commodity’s price: zero net flow of surplus value from agriculture.
Marx argues that barriers to the movement of capital implies that the total surplus value
(and hence value) generated in agriculture will remain in agriculture. This provides one
possible economic principle to determine the price of the agricultural commodity, viz., the
price of the agricultural commodity will be such as to ensure that the total surplus value
(and hence value) generated in agriculture remains in agriculture.
We need to address one important question about the price level that ensures the full
retention of surplus value in agriculture. Under what conditions will this price level ensure
positive amount of ground-rent on all plots of land? The intuitive answer is the one that
11That is why I have used the term ‘notional’ price of production.
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Marx worked with: relatively low organic composition of capital in agriculture. If the organic
composition of capital in agriculture is sufficiently low in comparison to the economy-wide
organic composition, then agriculture will generate sufficiently large amounts of surplus
profit at the aggregate level. If, given a sufficiently low organic composition in agriculture,
all the surplus profit is also retained in agriculture, then it is possible for each plot of land
to generate surplus profit, and hence ground-rent.
Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4 Plot N
Notional Price 
of Production
Market Price
Surplus 
Profit
Surplus Profit
...
Figure 1: Surplus profit in agriculture in the absence of landed property. The height of the
horizontal line represents the market price and the height of the bars on each plot represent the
notional price of production on that plot. The difference between the two represent surplus profit.
Once the price of the agricultural commodity has been determined, we can use it to
present the analysis of surplus profit and ground-rent, in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.
Figure 1 is used to show the existence of surplus profit in the absence of landed property.
Agricultural production is organized on plots of land, which are arranged in increasing order
of quality, with plot 1 the worst and plot N the best quality plot. Hence, the unit cost of
production falls as we move from plot 1 to plot N . Since the notional price of production is
the cost of production multiplied by (1 + α), that too falls across the plots of land. This is
depicted by the height of the bars on the plots of land. The difference between the market
price (measured by the height of the horizontal line) and the notional price of production
(measured by the height of the bar) gives the surplus profit on any plot of land. Hence, the
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surplus profit is lowest on the worst plot (plot 1) and increases secularly as we move to the
best plot (plot N), as depicted in Figure 1.
The existence of ground rent, as transformed surplus profit, can be seen graphically in
Figure 2. Plots of land have been arranged in increasing order of quality, as in Figure 1,
with plot 1 the worst and plot N the best quality plot of land. Surplus profit on the worst
plot of land is absolute rent, which is also the total ground-rent on the worst plot of land.
On all other plots of land, total ground-rent is the sum of absolute and differential rent, the
latter being the sum of DRI and DRII.
Plot 1 Plot 2 Plot 3 Plot 4 Plot N
Notional Price 
of Production
Market Price
Absolute 
Rent
Absolute 
Rent
Differential 
Rent
...
Figure 2: Surplus profit transformed into ground-rent in agriculture in the presence of landed
property. The height of the horizontal line represents the market price and the height of the bars
on each plot represent the notional price of production on that plot. For any plot of land, the
difference between the two represent total ground rent. The ground rent on the worst plot of land is
the absolute rent in this economy, which is earned on every plot of land. Hence, for any other plot
of land, the difference of the total ground rent and the absolute rent is the differential rent.
I will now illustrate the basic features of Marx’s analysis of ground-rent using three
examples. In the first example, we will study a capitalist agricultural economy where there
is no landed property, i.e., the land is owned by the capitalist farmers. This example will
clearly show the emergence of surplus profit. In the next two examples, we will study
capitalist agricultural economies with landed property. We will see how surplus profit is
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transformed into ground-rent once landed property is brought into the analysis, and how the
total ground-rent can be decomposed into absolute and differential rent.
3.4 Example 1: Surplus Profit in Agriculture without Landed
Property
Suppose there are 3 plots of land with varying quality, each owned by a different capitalist-
farmer. The worst plot of land produces 100 kgs of the agricultural commodity (wheat,
say); the medium plot of land produces 120 kgs/acre; and the high quality land produces
150 kgs/acre. All plots of land have the same cost of production: constant capital of 500
and variable capital of 500. Suppose the rate of exploitation is 100% so that the amount of
surplus value generated on each plot of land is 500. Suppose the economy-wide average rate
of profit is 10%. This information is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Surplus Profit in Capitalist Agriculture without Landed
Propertya
Land Quality
Low Medium High
Quantity of output (kgs/acre) 100 120 150
Constant capital ($) 500 500 500
Variable capital ($) 500 500 500
Surplus value ($) 500 500 500
Value ($) 1500 1500 1500
Constant capital ($/kg) 5.00 4.17 3.33
Variable capital ($/kg) 5.00 4.17 3.33
Surplus value ($/kg) 5.00 4.17 3.33
Value ($/kg) 15 12.50 10
Market price ($/kg) 12.16 12.16 12.16
Total revenue ($/acre) 1216.22 1459.46 1824.32
Profit ($/acre) 216.22 459.46 824.32
Profit rate (%) 21.62 45.95 82.43
Memo:
Average rate of profit (%) 10 10 10
Surplus profit ($/acre) 116.22 359.46 724.32
Surplus profit rate (%) 11.62 35.95 72.43
a The land used for cultivation is owned by the class of
capitalist-farmers themselves.
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We would like to compute the magnitudes of surplus profit on each plot of land. To do
so, we need to calculate the market price of wheat. We know that the price will be such as to
ensure that all the surplus value generated in agriculture remains in agriculture. This can be
ensured if the market price of wheat is equal to its value. Now, the total value generated in
agriculture is 4500 and the total amount of wheat produced is 370. Hence the price of wheat
which would ensure that all the value generated in agriculture is retained in agriculture is
given by 12.162 = (4500/370).
With this information on the price of the agricultural commodity, we can calculate the
total profit generated on the worst plot of land as 216.22 = ((12.162 ∗ 100) − 1000). Since
the economy-wide average rate of profit is 10%, the surplus profit on the worst plot of land
becomes 116.22 = (216.22− 1000 ∗ 0.1). In a similar manner, the total profit on the medium
quality plot of land is given by 459.46 = ((12.162∗120)−1000), so that the surplus profit on
the medium quality plot of land is 359.46 = (459.46− 1000 ∗ 0.1). Using the same logic, we
see that the total profit on the high quality plot of land is 824.32 = ((12.162 ∗ 150)− 1000),
so that the surplus profit on that plot is 724.32 = (824.32− 1000 ∗ 0.1).
3.5 Example 2: Ground-rent in Agriculture-I
We would now like to study the emergence of ground-rent in capitalist agriculture with
landed property. To facilitate comparison, we will work with the same data as used in the
previous example. All the technical conditions of production will remain as before and the
only change will relate to the structure of ownership. Instead of capitalist-farmers owning
the land, now the land will be owned by a class of landowners (who are different from the
class of capitalist-farmers). This will help in highlighting the social origins of ground-rent
and dispel any illusion that it derives from some natural property of land.
As before, suppose there are 3 plots of land with varying quality. The worst plot of
land produces 100 kgs of the agricultural commodity (wheat, say); the medium plot of
land produces 120 kgs/acre; and the high quality land produces 150 kgs/acre. The impor-
tant difference comes from the following fact: each plot of land is owned by a landowner.
Capitalist-farmers rent land from the landowners for a rental payment called ground-rent.
As before, all plots of land have the same cost of production: constant capital of 500
and variable capital of 500. Suppose the rate of exploitation is 100% so that the amount
of surplus value generated on each plot of land is 500. This information is summarised in
Table 2.
We would like to compute the magnitude of ground-rent, and its decomposition into
absolute and differential rent, on each plot of land. Since we have already calculated the
surplus profit on each plot of land in Example 1, we can draw on that information. We
know that the absolute rent is the surplus profit on the worst plot of land. Hence, using the
results in the first column of Table 1, we find that absolute rent in this economy is 116.22.
Using results from the second and third columns of Table 1, we see that the surplus profit
on the medium and high quality land is 359.46 and 724.32, respectively. This tells us the
magnitude of the total ground-rent on these plots: 359.46 and 724.32, respectively.
Next, we would like to decompose the total ground-rent into its components. The worst
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Table 2: Transformation of Surplus Profit into Ground-Rent in Capitalist Agri-
culture with Landed Propertya
Land Quality
Low Medium High
Quantity of output (kgs/acre) 100 120 150
Constant capital ($) 500 500 500
Variable capital ($) 500 500 500
Surplus value ($) 500 500 500
Value ($) 1500 1500 1500
Constant capital ($/kg) 5.00 4.17 3.33
Variable capital ($/kg) 5.00 4.17 3.33
Surplus value ($/kg) 5.00 4.17 3.33
Value ($/kg) 15 12.50 10
Ground-rent ($/acre) 116.22 359.46 724.32
Ground-rent ($/kg) 1.16 3.00 4.83
Average rate of profit (%) 10 10 10
Price of production without rent ($/kg) 11.00 11.00 11.00
Market price with rent ($/kg) 12.16 12.16 12.16
Total revenue ($/acre) 1216.22 1459.46 1824.32
Capitalist-farmer:
Profit after rent ($/acre) 100 100 100
Profit rate after rent (%) 10 10 10
Landowner:
Absolute rent ($/acre) 116.22 116.22 116.22
Differential rent I ($/acre) 0 243.24 608.10
Differential rent II ($/acre) 0 0 0
Total Ground-rent ($/acre) 116.22 359.46 724.32
a The land used for cultivation is owned by the class of landowners, who charge a
monetary payment called ground-rent to let capitalist-farmers use it for
cultivation of commodities.
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plot of land earns no differential rent. Hence, the total rent on the worst plot of land is equal
to the absolute rent, which implies that differential rent is zero. This is shown in the first
column of Table 2. Turning to the medium quality plot, we can find the differential rent as the
difference between the total ground-rent and the absolute rent: 243.24 = (359.46− 116.22).
In a similar way, we can find the differential rent on the best quality plot as 608.10 =
(724.32 − 116.22). Note that the differential rent in this example is entirely of the first
variety, DRI. This is because, by assumption, the capital invested is the same on each plot
of land. Since DRII arises from the difference in the magnitudes of capital invested on
different plots of land, in this example DRII is zero.
This example shows how the emergence of ground-rent entails a redistribution of surplus
value generated in capitalist agriculture between the class of capitalist-farmers (who organize
the production) and the class of landowners (who own the land). The landowners appropriate
the whole of the surplus profit on each plot of land. This leaves just enough surplus value with
the capitalist-farmers to ensure the average rate of profit, 10%, earned in the non-agricultural
economy.
3.6 Example 3: Ground-rent in Agriculture-II
In the example discussed in Table 2, differential rent of the second variety was ruled out by
construction. This was because the magnitude of capital advanced was the same on all the
three plots of land. In the next example I remove that restriction by letting the magnitude
of constant capital vary across the plots of land. For simplicity of calculations, I keep all
other aspects of the example same as in the previous example. The information relating to
this example is summarised in Table 3.
We are interested in computing the magnitude and decomposition of ground-rent on each
plot of land. To do so, we need to compute the price of the agricultural commodity and
then use the price data to compute surplus profit on each plot of land. Let us start with the
market price of the agricultural commodity.
The total value generated in agriculture is 4650 and the total output is 370. Hence the
price of the agricultural commodity - the price which keeps all the surplus value generated
in agriculture within agriculture - is 12.57 = (4650/370). With this information we can
now find the surplus profit on each plot of land. On the worst plot, the total profit is
256.76 = (12.57 ∗ 100 − 1000), so that the surplus profit is 156.76 = (256.76 − 1000 ∗ 0.1),
using the economy-wide average rate of profit of 10%. The total profit on the medium
quality plot is 458.11 = (12.57 ∗ 120 − 1050) and on the best quality plot is 785.14 =
(12.57 ∗ 150 − 1100). Thus, the surplus profit on the medium and best quality plots are,
respectively, 353.11 = (458.11− 1050 ∗ 0.1) and 675.14 = (785.14− 1100 ∗ 0.1).
Since the absolute ground-rent in this economy is the surplus profit on the worst plot of
land, we see that its magnitude is 156.76. This is also the total ground-rent on the worst
quality plot of land, as shown in the first column in Table 3. Turning to the medium quality
plot, we can calculate the total differential rent as the difference between the surplus profit
and the absolute rent. Hence, total differential rent is 196.35 = (353.11 − 156.76). To
decompose this into DRI and DRII, we need to compute the rate of profit generated on
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Table 3: Transformation of Surplus Profit into Ground-Rent in Capitalist
Agriculture with Landed Propertya
Land Quality
Low Medium High
Quantity of output (kgs/acre) 100 120 150
Constant capital ($) 500 550 600
Variable capital ($) 500 500 500
Surplus value ($) 500 500 500
Value ($) 1500 1550 1600
Unit cost of production ($/kg) 10.00 8.75 7.33
Average rate of profit (%) 10.00 10.00 10.00
Price of production before rent ($/kg) 11.00 11.00 11.00
Market price with rent ($/kg) 12.57 12.57 12.57
Total revenue on sale ($/acre) 1256.76 1508.11 1885.14
Ground-rent ($/acre) 156.76 353.11 675.14
Ground-rent ($/kg) 1.57 2.94 4.50
Capitalist-farmer:
Profit after rent ($/acre) 100 105 110
Profit rate after rent (%) 10 10 10
Landowner:
Absolute rent ($/acre) 156.76 156.76 156.76
Differential rent I (%) 0 188.51 502.70
Differential rent II (%) 0 7.84 15.68
Total Ground-rent ($/acre) 156.76 353.11 675.14
a The land used for cultivation is owned by the class of landowners, who charge a
monetary payment called ground-rent to let capitalist-farmers use it for
cultivation of commodities.
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each of the plots.12
On the worst plot of land, the total profit generated is 256.76 and the cost of production
is 1000. Hence the rate of profit generated on the worst quality plot is 25.67%. Similarly,
the total profit on the medium quality plot is 458.11 and the total cost of production is
1050. Hence, the rate of profit is 43.63%. Using the same logic, the rate of profit on the best
quality plot is 71.38% = (785.14/1100). With this information, we can now compute DRI
on the medium and best quality plots.
The magnitude of DRI on the medium quality plot is the product of the capital advanced
and the difference of the rate of profit with the worst quality plot: 188.51 = (1050 ∗ (0.436−
0.257)). Similarly, the magnitude of DRI on the best quality plot is 502.70 = (1100∗(0.714−
0.257)). The difference of the total differential rent and DRI gives us the magnitude of DRII
on both plots, as shown in the second and third columns of Table 3.
4 How Relevant is this Analysis?
4.1 Two Issues
There can be at least two sources of scepticism about the usefulness of Marx’s theory of
ground-rent as a framework for the investigation of contemporary capitalism. First, Marx’s
analysis focused on the phenomenon of ground-rent in the context of European capitalist
agricultural production in the presence of landed property. How relevant is that analysis
for contemporary capitalism where the class of landlords, i.e. what Marx referred to as
landed property, has virtually disappeared from large parts of the world? Second, Marx’s
analysis of ground-rent, as we have seen, relies quite heavily on the assumption that the
organic composition of capital in agriculture is lower than the economy-wide average. It
is well known that capital intensity of production processes in agriculture has increased
across large parts of the world, so that it is no longer possible to argue that agriculture
is characterized by a lower than average organic composition of capital.13 For many other
industries where the use of non-produced resources is important, like mining, oil and natural
gas, construction, the capital intensity of production is in no obvious sense lower than other
sectors of the economy. Thus, a question that needs to be addressed is whether Marx’s
analysis remains valid even when the sector under investigation does not have lower than
average organic composition of capital. I will address these two concerns in turn.
While the disappearance of the class of landowners in agriculture from large parts of
the world might suggest that Marx’s analysis of ground-rent is no longer relevant, that
is incorrect. While Marx had analysed the emergence of ground-rent with reference to
agricultural production in the presence of landed property, the analysis can be equally well
applied to understand rent income in a variety of contemporary settings, like mining, real
12For the expression for DRI and DRII, refer to equation (3) in the text.
13In many developing countries, the assumption is, of course, still largely valid. But in these countries, cap-
italism is still dominated by petty commodity production. That complicates the straightforward application
of Marx’s theory.
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estate, oil and natural gas production, tourism. What is important is the structure of
relationship that is established in the production process between, on the one hand, the
capitalist commodity producer, and on the the other, the owner of some non-produced
resource that is used for that production. As long as capitalist commodity production uses
some privately owned non-produced resource that is limited in quantity, as is the case, for
instance, in mining, in oil and natural gas production, in real estate development, the owner
of that resource can bargain away a part of the surplus value in the form of rent. Whether
the commodity produced is wheat or natural gas or tourism services is not very germane to
the analysis. Thus, the fact that Marx referred primarily to agriculture in Volume Three
of Capital does not in any way reduce the relevance of that analysis for contemporary
capitalism.
How crucial is the assumption of lower than average organic composition of capital in the
sector where rent is generated? It is far less important that seems apparent at first. What
is crucial for the emergence of rent in a sector with privately owned non-produced resources
is that the market price of the commodity produced with the non-produced resource be
such that it generates surplus profit on each plot of ‘land’. In Volume Three of Capital,
Marx had proposed a specific mechanism for the determination of the market price that
relied on the assumption of lower than average organic composition of capital. But as I had
pointed out earlier, what Marx had proposed was only one possible mechanism. There can
be other mechanisms for the determination of the market price of the relevant commodity.
These alternative mechanisms need not rely on a lower than average organic composition of
capital.
Consider, as an example, a sector with a higher than average organic composition of
capital. If the market price for the commodity of this sector were to equal the price of
production, then this sector would lose surplus value on a net basis. But if some conjunctural
factors led to a sudden increase in demand, which ensured, in turn, that the market price was
above the price of production, then this sector would generate surplus profit on an aggregate
level even though it had a higher than average organic composition of capital. Moreover, if
the market price was sufficiently higher than the price of production then each plot of ‘land’
would generate surplus profit, so that the owner of the plot could appropriate ground-rent.
If, instead of a spurt of demand, there was intervention by the State, in favour of some
influential class of resource owners, to keep the relevant price high, the same result would
arise.
What might be examples of such scenarios? An example with contemporary relevance
is the agricultural, mining and oil production sectors in Latin America. In the 2000s, there
was a spurt of demand for minerals and oil, driven largely by the phenomenal growth of
China. This spurt of demand led to a sustained increase in the market price of ores and
oil. In such a situation, owners of non-produced resources like land in Latin American
countries that produced oil, copper, iron, soy, etc. were able to earn ground-rent even
though the production processes in many of these industries were quite capital intensive.
Thus, ground-rent might have been generated even when the organic composition of capital
in these industries were higher than the economy-wide average. Another example might be a
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case where big capital influences the State in a Third World country to enact import barriers
to keep the price of a commodity high. If the commodity is produced with a highly capital
intensive technology and also uses some non-produced resource, like land, then the owners
of that resource might be able to appropriate ground-rent. If the resource is owned by the
capitalists themselves, then a part of their profit would come from ground-rent. The bottom
line is that the generation of ground-rent in a sector does not need to be necessarily based
on a lower than average organic composition of capital in that sector.
Next, I highlight the power of Marx’s theory of ground-rent by discussing two applications
relevant to contemporary capitalism. The first is an analysis of the price of real estate; and
the second is an issue that has puzzled commentators of the contemporary Indian economy:
rentier orientation of big capital.
4.2 Application-I: Real Estate Prices
Can we explain the price of real estate using Marx’s theory of ground-rent? By real estate, I
refer to commercial or residential buildings. Since buildings are constructed on pieces of land,
the price of the real estate comes from two sources: (a) price of the building, and (b) price
of the land on which the building is constructed. Of course, the two prices are determined
by very different principles. Since the building is a commodity, its price is determined like
any other commodity, i.e. in the long run, the price of the building is its price of production.
On the other hand, the price of the land, which is a non-produced resource (and not a
commodity), is the capitalized value of the rent income entailed by ownership of the land.14
Thus, the price of real estate is the sum of the price of the building (the commodity) and
the price of the land (the non-produced resource). Hence real estate prices can increase if
either of the two terms in the sum increase. If we take a long run perspective, then the price
of the building (the commodity) is either going to be stable or fall, the latter coming from
technological change and the former arising when there is no technological change. On the
other hand, there is no such principle determining or limiting the price of the land. One can
conclude that the long run increase in real estate prices comes largely from the increases in
the price of land. But why does the price of land increase in the long run?
Capitalist development rests on the primitive accumulation of capital. The population
uprooted from agricultural production in rural areas gradually move to urban areas, at
different speeds across different countries, in search of livelihood in the form of wage-labour.
This increases the demand for housing, and by implication, the demand for land on which
houses could be constructed. As population pressures increase and transportation costs
decline, the size of urban centers of industrial production increases. Hence, more and more
14In this context, it is important to clarify that the commonly used term ‘rent’ to refer to payments made
to use a building, or apartment, for a fixed period of time is conceptually very different from ‘ground-rent’
that we have been discussing in this paper. When a building or apartment is rented out, the transaction
involves a piecemeal sale of a commodity (the building or the apartment). Thus the rent one pays to use
a building or apartment for a fixed period of time is a portion of the price of the building or apartment.
Ground-rent, on the other hand, is a portion of the surplus value appropriated by an owner of a non-produced
resource that is limited in quantity and can be used in capitalist commodity production.
23
land is used for construction of residential and commercial buildings. In an approximate
sense, this process of urban expansion is like the expansion of agricultural production from
the best to worse quality plots of land. While in the case of agriculture, ‘quality’ refers to
fertility of the soil, in the context of urban expansion, ‘quality’ refers to locational advantages.
Locational advantage is, in turn, determined by many factors like public infrastructure, the
density of networks of firms, production hubs, transportation networks, educational and
health facilities, etc. The important implication is that as demand for housing increases,
increasingly worse quality land is used for construction, which increases the differential rent
earned by infra marginal, i.e. better than the worst, plots of land, just as in the case of
agriculture.
There is another factor which increase the amount of differential rent earned by the
infra marginal plots of land: state investment. As the State builds better infrastructure in
the ‘center’ of the cities, that investment activity improves the locational advantage of the
‘center’. It is as if the ‘quality’ of the plots of land at or near the center of the city improves.
This increases the differential rent earned by these plots of land.15
A slightly different way to understand the effect of State investment on land prices is
to compare it to agricultural production under a lease contract between a landowner and a
capitalist-farmer, a situation discussed in Marx (1993, pp. 757). All improvements in the
fertility of the land that come through investments by the capitalist-farmer is finally captured
by the landowner at the end of the lease period because the improvements are embodied in
the land, and land is owned by the landowner. Thus, when a new lease is worked out, the
landowner adds the interest payment on the capital investment to the previous ground-rent.
The total amount of the rent income of the landowner increases. In an analogous manner,
when investments are made by the State to improve infrastructure in an urban area, the
interest on the capital investment is captured by the owner of the plot of urban land as an
addition to ground-rent proper.
Thus, pushed up by increasing demand - which comes from population growth, urbaniza-
tion and income growth due to capitalist development - and public spending to build better
infrastructure, the differential rent earned by infra marginal plots keep increasing. Since
the price of land is the capitalized value of ground-rent entailed by ownership of the land,
it increases with the increase in ground-rent, the latter being driven up by the increase in
differential rent.
There is an important political economy angle here that is worth noting. The increase in
differential rent arises partly from the continuous improvements in the urban environment -
coming largely through capital investments by the State in building roads, lighting and other
public infrastructure - that translates to improvements in the locational aspects of plots of
infra marginal land. Since the improvements in the quality of the land accrues to its owners,
the rapid increase in the price of urban real estate is an example of the private appropriation
15I use ‘center’ with quotes because it might not be the geographical center of an urban area, but rather
the economic center. For instance, in the US, inner city neighbourhoods have been systematically starved
of infrastructural development, even as resources have been ploughed into developing the suburbs. In this
case, the geographical center - the inner city neighbourhoods - and the economic center - the suburbs - are
different.
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of the benefits of public investments.16
4.3 Application-II: Indian Big Capital’s Rentier Orientation
Ever since the initiation of market oriented reforms in India in the early 1990s, the State has
provided big capital with access to natural resources like land at throwaway prices. What
has puzzled many activists and commentators is the fact that in most cases where the State
has provided land to big capital for the purposes of setting up manufacturing and service
sector production units, large parts of that land has not been used for this purpose. Instead,
capitalist have rented out significant parts of the State-provided land provided to real estate
operators and builders.
One way to make sense of this puzzling phenomenon is to compare the rate of return from
two alternative uses of the land. In the first scenario, the capitalist might use it to set up a
production unit and make profit by selling some commodity, which could be manufacturing
sector items like cars or computers, or services like IT and IT-enabled services. In the second
scenario, the capitalist rents out the land for real estate development, and earns ground-rent.
In the context of the contemporary Indian economy, it is easy to see why the second option
provides a far higher rate of return.
Market-oriented reforms has led to a highly disequalizing growth process over the last few
decades. Large parts of the income that is accruing at the top end of the income distribution
is used by the rich and wealthy to purchase real estate for speculative purposes. This has
created a spurt in the demand for houses, apartments, shopping malls, multiplexes, either
directly or in a derived manner. The growth in speculative demand operates on top of growht
in real demand for housing that arises from capitalist development, urbanization and some
undeniable income growth across the income distribution.
The spurt in demand, coming from real and speculative sources, has pushed up prices
of real estate, probably much higher than its price of production. On the other hand, the
technology of production has also become increasingly capital intensive as large real estate
firms have started accounting for increasingly larger shares of the construction industry,
especially in big cities. This has probably meant an increase in the organic composition
of capital in the construction industry. All these together imply that owners of land stand
to gain handsome sums of ground-rent, even as the sectoral organic composition of capital
has increased. Hence, renting out land for real estate development ensures a far higher rate
of return than what is available in the production of cars or IT services. This might be
one of the reasons why big capital rents out significant parts of the land it gets from the
State for real estate development instead of using it for developing manufacturing or service
16Discussing the same issue, Marx notes how landowners reap benefits of investments made by others.
“His rent thus swells; or, if he plans to sell the land ... its value has now risen. He does not sell just the land,
but rather the improved land, the capital incorporated into the earth, which has cost him nothing. This is
one of the secrets ... of the increasing enrichment of the landowners, the constant inflation of their rents and
the growing money value of their estates as economic development progresses. Thus they put away in their
own private purses the result of a social development achieved without their participation - they are frege
consumere nati.” (Marx, 1993, pp. 757).
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industries. It clearly prefers rentier income to profits from production because the former
are far higher than the latter.
The underlying political economy is also worth paying attention to. Land, often prime
agricultural land, is forcibly taken away from peasants by the State and handed over to big
capital with the stated goal to promote industrialization or service sector-led labour-intensive
growth. In the backdrop of the robust and rising demand for real estate, big capital has strong
incentives to rent out significant parts of the land it got from the State to the real estate
sector. Thus, the intention of the State to foster industrialization or service-sector growth
is willy nilly frustrated, not because of lack of land but because of the operation of perverse
incentives. But the vulnerable peasants pay a heavy price, nonetheless. While it is true that
the construction sector employs a large segment of the working population, it has become
increasingly capital intensive over time, so that it absorbs fewer workers now than a decade
ago. Moreover, a long run growth strategy can hardly rely on the growth of the construction
in place of the manufacturing or services sector.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented an analytical exposition of Marx’s theory of ground-rent.
I have demonstrated that Marx’s claim about ground-rent being a transformed form of
surplus profit can be rigorously established and analysed. Surplus profit, which arises in
agriculture because the organic composition of capital in agricultural production is lower
than the economy-wide average rate of profit, can be transformed into ground-rent in the
presence of landed property, i.e. ownership of land by a class of landowners (who are different
from the class of capitalist-farmers). The total ground-rent can be seen to be composed of
two components: differential rent and absolute rent. Differential rent, in turn, is composed
of differential rent of the first variety (which arises from differences in the quality of land)
and differential rent of the second variety (which arises from the differences in the magnitude
of capital investment on different plots of land). Absolute rent, on the other hand, arises
from the ability of the class of landowners to collude and prevent even the worst quality of
land being given gratis for cultivation.
I have also argued that Marx’s theory of ground-rent can be extended in at least two
directions that make it relevant as a framework for analysing many features of contemporary
capitalism. While Marx had primarily analysed agriculture, the analysis applied to any
capitalist commodity production which uses some privately owned non-produced resource
that is limited in quantity. Moreover, the assumption that the sector generating ground-
rent have a lower than average organic composition of capital is not essential. If alternative
mechanisms can ensure the price of the commodity to be sufficiently higher than the price of
production, then the sector can generate ground-rent even with a higher than average organic
composition of capital. These two extensions imply that Marx’s theory of ground-rent can
be used to analyse some features of industries like mining, oil and natural gas, housing and
real estate, in contemporary capitalism.
An interesting direction for future analysis is the political economy of the determination
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of the price of agricultural commodities, price of oil, natural gas, and minerals. The analysis
of ground-rent shows that the total surplus value created in the production of the relevant
commodity is divided between the class of capitalist producers and the class of landowners.
Moreover, the proportion in which this division takes place is impacted crucially by the
price of the agricultural commodity. Thus, the determination of the price of the agricultural
commodity in the presence of landed property will involve class struggle between landowners
and capitalist-farmers, as witnessed in mid-nineteenth century England during the debate
over the repeal of the Corn Laws. There might very well be parallels in the contemporary
world.
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6 Appendix A
In this appendix I will present the argument in mathematical form.
6.1 Surplus Profit and Ground-Rent in Agriculture
Let i = 1, 2, . . . , N index the plots of land arranged in increasing order of their quality. Thus,
plot 1 refers to the worst and plot N refers to the best plot of land. Let yi > 0 denote the
output produced on plot i, and let ci ≥ 0 and vi > 0 denote the constant and variable capital
used for producing the output on plot i.17 Thus, the total cost of production (which is also
the total capital investment) on plot i is given by ci + vi, the sum of constant and variable
capital.18 Let ki denote the cost of production per unit of output on plot i, i.e.,
ki =
ci + vi
yi
. (4)
The hierarchy of the quality of plots of land is an important characteristic of the agricultural
economy and is captured by the fact that the unit cost of production stands in a relationship
of hierarchy, with the worst plot of land having the highest cost and the best plot having
the lowest cots. We state this important characteristic of the agricultural economy as
Assumption 1. Let i = 1, 2, . . . , N index the plots of land arranged in increasing order of
quality, and therefore in decreasing order of unit cost of production. Then, we have
k1 ≥ k2 ≥ · · · ≥ kN , (5)
where
ki =
ci + vi
yi
denotes the unit cost of production on plot i.
Let α denote the economy-wide average rate of profit, and let ri denote the rate of profit
earned by capitalist agricultural production, in the absence of landed property, on plot i. The
‘surplus profit’ on plot i is the profit income in excess of what is implied by the economy-wide
average rate of profit. Hence, if SPi refers to surplus profit on plot i, then we have
SPi = (ci + vi)ri − (ci + vi)α = (ci + vi)(ri − α). (6)
When agricultural production is organized along capitalist lines with all the cultivable
land owned by the class of landlords, it is this surplus profit that is appropriated as ground-
rent. Thus, ground-rent is the ‘surplus profit’ appropriated by the landowners. Thus, given
17The variable capital needs to be bounded away from zero to ensure that the organic composition of
capital does not increase without bounds. The economic content of this assumption is that production
cannot take place without labour, a most meaningful assumption.
18I ignore fixed capital in this paper.
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the magnitude of ‘capital advanced’ on plot i, i.e. the value of constant and variable capital,
we can define the magnitude of ground-rent on that plot as
GRi = (ci + vi)(ri − α). (7)
Marx argued that the total ground-rent on any plot of land can be decomposed into three
parts, differential rent of the first variety, differential rent of the second variety and absolute
rent. A little algebraic manipulation shows that this is indeed the case:
GRi = DRIi +DRIIi + AR (8)
where
DRIi = (ci + vi)(ri − r1)
is differential rent of the first variety,
DRIIi = [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α)
is differential rent of the second variety, and
AR = (c1 + v1)(r1 − α)
is absolute rent.
To quantify the flow of ground-rent, defined in (2), we begin with an analysis of a bench-
mark case of capitalist agricultural production without landed property. This will allow us
to clearly see the logic for emergence of surplus profit and also help us in quantifying its
magnitude. Since ground-rent is a transformation of surplus profit, this will allow us to
immediately arrive at a quantitative measure of the magnitude of total ground-rent. In the
next step, we will be able to quantify its three components: absolute rent (AR), differential
rent of the first variety (DRI), and differential rent of the second variety (DRII).
6.2 Capitalist Agriculture without Landed Property
In the absence of landed property, the class of capitalist-farmers own the land used for
agricultural production and hire landless labourers to do the actual work of cultivation.
We make the simplifying assumption that the total land area is divided equally among the
capitalist farmers and that the area of each capitalist farmer’s land is normalised to one unit
(one acre, say).19 They use their own (or borrowed) money capital to purchase means of
production and labour-power to produce agricultural commodities.
19We abstract from the possible unequal distribution of land among the farmers because that is not the
main issue under investigation in this paper.
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6.2.1 Hierarchy of Profit Rates
A key feature of the agricultural plots of land is that they vary by quality, as noted in
Assumption 1. Hierarchy of quality of plots of land will imply a hierarchy of rates of profit
when agricultural production is organized along capitalist lines. This will be useful below
when we prove that differential rent of the first variety, DRI, is positive. Hence, we state
this below as
Proposition 1. Let ri denote the rate of profit earned by capitalist-farmer i (who owns plot
i), where i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; then, we have
r1 ≤ r2 ≤ · · · ≤ rN . (9)
Proof. Let us denote the price of a unit of the agricultural commodity as p and note that
it will be determined by the cost of production in the worst plot of land (Marx, 1993, pp.
797). Since the rate of profit earned by the capitalist-farmer with the worst quality of land,
i.e. the capitalist-farmer indexed by i = 1, is given by r1,
py1 = (c1 + v1) + r1 (c1 + v1)
so that the price of an unit of the agricultural commodity is given by
p =
(
c1 + v1
y1
)
(1 + r1) = k1 (1 + r1) . (10)
All capitalist-farmers will be able to sell their output at the price given in (10). Hence, the
revenue earned by capitalist-farmer i is given by pyi. Since the total cost of production on
plot i is (ci + vi), using the expression for the price of the agricultural commodity given in
(10), we see that the total profit earned by capitalist i is given by
pii = pyi − (ci + vi) = k1yi (1 + r1)− (ci + vi) , i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N. (11)
Hence, the rate of profit earned by capitalist-farmer i is given by
ri =
pii
ci + vi
=
[
k1
ki
(1 + r1)− 1
]
. (12)
Hence,
1 + ri+1
1 + ri
=
ki
ki+1
≥ 1,
where the last inequality comes from the use of (5). Hence,
r1 ≤ r2 ≤ · · · ≤ rN (13)
This completes the proof.
30
6.2.2 Existence of Surplus Profit in Agriculture as a Whole
Price of the agricultural commodity plays an important role in the emergence of surplus
profit and ground-rent, and we now turn to its analysis. Suppose p denotes a generic market
price of the agricultural commodity. If r denotes the corresponding average rate of profit in
agriculture, then
pY = (C + V ) (1 + r)
where C =
∑N
i=1 ci is the total constant capital used, V =
∑N
i=1 vi is the total variable
capital used, and Y =
∑N
i=1 yi is the total output in agriculture. Hence,
p =
(
C + V
Y
)
(1 + r) (14)
which is the product of the average unit cost of production, (C + V )/Y , and (1 + r).
Let p denote the notional price of production in agriculture, i.e. the price of the agri-
cultural commodity at which agriculture as a whole earns the economy-wide average rate of
profit, α.20 Then,
p =
(
C + V
Y
)
(1 + α) . (15)
A comparison of (14) and (15) shows that whenever the price of the agricultural commodity is
above its notional price of production, the agricultural sector as a whole will generate surplus
profit, i.e. the average rate of profit in agriculture will be higher than the economy-wide
average rate of profit.
Proposition 2. Let p denote the price of the agricultural commodity and let the correspond-
ing average rate of profit in agriculture be r. Let p denote the notional price of production
for the agricultural commodity. If p > p then the average rate of profit earned in agriculture,
r, is higher than the economy-wide average rate of profit, α, i.e. r > α.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from a comparison of (14) and (15).
6.2.3 Existence of Surplus Profit on the Worst Plot of Land
Let p˜ denote the price of the agricultural commodity which ensures the economy-wide average
rate of profit, α, on the worst plot of land, i.e. the plot of land indexed by i = 1. Since the
output on plot 1 is given by y1, we have
p˜y1 = (c1 + v1) (1 + α)
20I call it the ‘notional’ price of production because agriculture does not participate, due to barriers to the
movement of capital into agriculture, in the formation of the average rate of profit and prices of production.
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so that
p˜ =
(
c1 + v1
y1
)
(1 + α) (16)
The price level of the agricultural commodity given by p˜ is an important benchmark. When-
ever the price of the agricultural commodity is higher than p˜, all plots of land will generate
surplus profit. This follows from a conjunction of two facts: (a) that the price level of p˜
ensures surplus profit on the worst plot of land, and (b) that there is a hierarchy of profit
rates in agriculture with profit rates increasing with the quality of the plot of land (see
Proposition 1).
How does the notional price of production, p, compare with the price that ensures sur-
plus profit on the worst plot of land, p˜? Intuitively, the latter should be higher than the
former. The notional price of production ensures the economy-wide average rate of profit for
agriculture as a whole. Since there is a hierarchy of rates of profit, as shown in Proposition 1,
this means that if the agricultural commodity sells at its notional price of production, the
rate of profit on the worst plot of land will be lower than α, the economy-wide average rate
of profit. Hence, the price which can ensure the economy-wide average rate of profit on the
worst plot of land has to be higher than the notional price of production for agriculture. I
formalise this intuition in
Proposition 3. Let p denote the price of the agricultural commodity at which agriculture as
a whole earns the economy-wide average rate of profit, α, and let p˜ denote the price of the
agricultural commodity which ensures the economy-wide average rate rate of profit, α, for
the worst plot of land; then p < p˜.
Proof. Using (15) and (16), we see that
p˜
p
=
(c1 + v1) /y1
(C + V ) /Y
.
Note that
C + V
Y
=
1
Y
N∑
i=1
ci + vi =
N∑
i=1
(
ci + vi
yi
)(yi
Y
)
=
N∑
i=1
kiλi
where ki = (ci + vi) /yi is the unit cost of production on plot i and λi = yi/Y so that for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , 0 < λi < 1. Under Assumption 1 and the fact that 0 < λi < 1, we have
λik1 > λiki, i = 2, 3, . . . , N.
Hence
N∑
i=2
λik1 >
N∑
i=2
λiki
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so that adding λ1k1 to both sides, we have
λ1k1 +
N∑
i=2
λik1 > λ1k1 +
N∑
i=2
λiki =
N∑
i=1
λiki
which shows that
k1
N∑
i=1
λi >
N∑
i=1
λiki.
Since
∑N
i=1 λi = 1, this shows that
k1 >
N∑
i=1
λiki.
But (c1 + v1) /y1 = k1 and
∑N
i=1 λiki = (C + V ) /Y , which completes the proof.
6.2.4 Determination of the Price of the Agricultural Commodity
In Marx’s analysis the price of the agricultural commodity is determined by the principle
that agriculture retains all the surplus value it generates. Let p∗ denote the price of the
agricultural commodity at which agriculture as a whole realises the total surplus value it
generates. Then,
p∗Y = (C + V ) (1 + r∗)
where
r∗ =
eV
C + V
=
e
1 + (C/V )
=
e
1 +OCCA
(17)
and e is the common rate of exploitation (ratio of surplus value and variable capital) that
obtains in all sectors of the economy, and
OCCA =
C
V
is the organic composition of capital for the agricultural sector as a whole. Hence,
p∗ =
(
C + V
Y
)
(1 + r∗) (18)
At this point we need to introduce one important characteristic of the agricultural econ-
omy: it has a lower organic composition of capital than the whole economy. We state this
as
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Assumption 2. Let OCCA denote the organic composition of capital in the agricultural
sector as a whole, and let
OCCE =
C
V
denote the organic composition of capital in the economy as a whole. A characteristic feature
of agriculture is that
OCCA < OCCE.
This assumption about the organic composition of capital in agriculture has an immediate
implication.
Proposition 4. If Assumption 2 holds, then p < p∗.
Proof. The proof follows immediately by comparing (15) and (18), and noting that, by
Assumption 2, we have
e
1 +OCCA
= r∗ > α =
e
1 +OCCE
.
What is the meaning of Assumption 2 and what is the implication of Proposition 4? This
proposition shows that if the price of the agricultural commodity is such as to ensure that
all the surplus value generated in agriculture is retained in agriculture, then the agricultural
sector as a whole generates surplus profit. How do we know this? This is where Assumption 2
comes in. It tells us that agriculture has a lower organic composition of capital than the
whole economy. Hence each unit of capital invested in agriculture generates higher amounts
of surplus value. Thus, if agriculture is able to retain all the surplus value it generates, it
will earn a higher rate of profit than the economy-wide average rate of profit. That is why p,
which ensures the economy-wide average of profit, is lower than p∗. Moreover, this ensures
that all the surplus value generated in agriculture is retained in agriculture.
We are now ready to prove one of the main results of this paper as
Proposition 5. Let z1 = 1 +OCCA, z2 = 1 +OCCE, and
β =
(c1 + v1)/y1
(C + V )/Y
be the ratio of the unit production cost on the worst plot of land and the economy-wide average
unit production cost. Suppose 1 + e > β, and z2 > eβ/ (1 + e− β). Let us define a function
f (z2) =
ez2
(β − 1) z2 + eβ .
For any z2, if z1 < f (z2) then p
∗ > p˜.
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Proof. Note that, by Proposition 3, β > 1. Hence (β − 1) z2 + eβ > 0 (since z2, e > 0).
Thus, if
z1 <
ez2
(β − 1) z2 + eβ
then, multiplying through by (β − 1) z2 + eβ, we have
z1z2 (β − 1) + eβz1 < ez2
β (z1z2 + ez1) < z1z2 + ez2
which, on division through by z1z2 (which is a positive quantity), gives
β
(
1 +
e
z2
)
<
(
1 +
e
z1
)
β
(
1 +
e
1 +OCCE
)
<
(
1 +
e
1 +OCCA
)
(
c1 + v1
y1
)(
1 +
e
1 +OCCE
)
<
(
C + V
Y
)(
1 +
e
1 +OCCA
)
p˜ =
(
c1 + v1
y1
)
(1 + r) <
(
C + V
Y
)
(1 + r∗) = p∗.
This completes the proof.
What is the meaning of, and intuition behind, this result? From the definition of p˜ in
(16), we know that any price which is higher than p˜ will ensure surplus profit on the worst
plot of land. Proposition 5 provides conditions under which p∗ > p˜. Hence, Proposition 5
provides conditions under which the price level p∗ (which is the price level of the agricultural
commodity which ensures that all the surplus value generated in agriculture is also retained
in agriculture) is adequate to ensure that the worst plot of land generates surplus profit.
The key condition driving the result in Proposition 5 is defined with the function f(z2),
which is depicted on the domain z2 ≥ 1 in Figure 3 (since z2 = 1 +OCCE, it does not make
sense to consider value of z2 which are strictly less than 1 because OCCE is always positive).
The function f(z2) is concave (because f
′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0).21 For z2 = 1 it takes the
value e/ (β − 1 + eβ), and it asymptotically approaches the value e/ (β − 1) as z2 increases
without bound. Since 1 + e > β, which is one of the assumptions underlying Proposition 5,
e
(β − 1 + eβ) < 1 <
e
(β − 1)
so that the function lies partly above and partly below 1. Since z1 = 1 + OCCA, the only
meaningful region to consider is when the value of the function is equal to or above 1 (which
21f ′(z2) = e2β/ [(β − 1) z2 + eβ]2 > 0; f ′′(z2) =
[−2 (β − 1)βe2 {(β − 1)z2 + eβ}] / [{(β − 1) z2 + eβ}4] <
0 for z2 ≥ 1.
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is equivalent to the requirement that OCCA ≥ 0). A little algebra shows that f(z2) > 1 for
z2 ≥ eβ/ (1 + e− β) > 1. That is why this requirement is additionally specified as one of
the conditions in Proposition 5.
What is the intuition behind the result in Proposition 5? The condition involving the
function f(z2) shows that, given any level of OCCE (the organic composition of capital in
the whole economy), as long as OCCA (the organic composition of capital in agriculture as a
whole) is lower than some threshold value (defined by the concave function of OCCE), p
∗ will
be greater than p˜. Thus, if OCCA is lower than the threshold defined by 1− f(1 +OCCE),
then the price of the agricultural commodity determined by the retention of the whole surplus
value is high enough to ensure surplus profit on the worst plot of land, and hence on all plots
of land. This condition can also be seen geometrically in Figure 3: as long as the economy
operates in the shaded region, p∗ will be larger than p˜.
The intuition for this condition is the following: when the organic composition of capital
in agriculture is lower than this threshold, a large enough volume of surplus profit is generated
in agriculture. This makes intuitive sense because the magnitude of surplus profit depends
on the difference of the profit rate in agriculture with the economy-wide average rate of
profit. The condition tells us that the difference between OCCA and OCCE is large enough
to ensure that, if all of the surplus value is retained in agriculture, surplus profit is generated
even on the worst plot of land. This immediately shows that if the price of the agricultural
commodity is given by p = p∗, then surplus profit will be generated on all plots of land
(because of the hierarchy of rates of profit).
Figure 3 also allows us to see a potential limitation of Marx’s analysis. In Volume Three
of Capital, Marx worked with the assumption that the organic composition of capital in
agriculture as a whole is lower than the organic composition of capital in the whole economy.
Proposition 5 and Figure 3 shows that this is not enough to generate surplus profit on all
plots of land. One needs a more stringent condition,
z1 ≤ f (z2) = ez2
(β − 1) z2 + eβ
to ensure that the price level of p = p∗ generates surplus profit on all plots of land. Since
ground-rent is just a transformation of surplus profit, this shows that Marx’s analysis of
ground-rent would remain incomplete if the condition z1 < f (z2) were not imposed.
The fact that this condition is more stringent than the simple requirement of lower OCC
in agriculture than the OCC in the aggregate economy can also be seen from Figure 3. The
curve representing f(z2) lies completely below the 45 degree line.
22 Hence, any point on or
below the curve automatically satisfies the condition that OCCA < OCCE. But there are
points in Figure 3 that are above the curve and below the 45 degree line. These points satisfy
the requirement that OCCA < OCCE but do not ensure positive surplus profit on all plots
of land. Hence, the condition that Marx works with, viz., OCCA < OCCE, is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition to give all the results that he thought would hold with regard
to ground-rent.
22This is because f(1) < 1 and f ′(1) < 1.
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z1
z2
f(z2)
1
1
e/(β-1+eβ)
eβ/(1+e-β)
e/(β-1)
45˚
Figure 3: Upper bound function for the organic composition in agriculture. For any value of
z2 = 1+OCCE, the function f(z2) gives the upper bound on z1 = 1+OCCA that ensures the result
in Proposition 5.
Drawing on the above discussion, we can characterise the agricultural economy with two
crucial conditions necessary for the analysis of surplus profit and ground-rent. The first
condition relates to the price of the agricultural commodity and the second relates to the
organic composition of capital in agriculture.
Assumption 3. Let the price of the agricultural commodity, p, be determined by the prin-
ciple that there is zero net flow of surplus value from agriculture, so that p = p∗, with p∗
defined in (18).
Let
z1 ≤ f (z2) = ez2
(β − 1) z2 + eβ
where z1 = 1 +OCCA, z2 = 1 +OCCE,
β =
(c1 + v1)/y1
(C + V )/Y
and 1 + e > β, z2 > eβ/ (1 + e− β).
37
I would like to draw out three important implications of the two conditions stated in
Assumption 3. First, the agricultural economy characterised in Assumption 3 generates a
positive amount of surplus profit at the aggregate level. This is because the price of the
agricultural commodity is given by p∗, which is higher than the notional price of production,
p (by Proposition 4). Since any price higher than p generates suplus profit in agriculture as
a whole, the price level of p∗ will also do so. This conclusion is necessary for our subsequent
analysis because, in Marx’s understanding, ground-rent is a transformation of surplus profit
in agriculture. Thus, without surplus profit there would be no ground-rent.
Second, the market price of the agricultural commodity is determined by the principle
that agriculture retains all the surplus value it generates, the latter being justified by the fact
of existence of barriers to movement of capital in agriculture. This implies that the price of
the agricultural commodity is given by p = p∗. It is important to point out that this is only
one, though by no means the only, way to determine the market price of the agricultural
commodity. We use it in this paper because this is close to the intuitive idea Marx worked
with: barriers to the movement of capital into agriculture would allow agriculture to retain
the surplus profit (and hence the total surplus value) it generates.23
Third, the conjunction of the first and the second condition ensures, as Proposition 5
shows, that each plot of land generates surplus profit. This conclusion is used to ensure that
all plots of land are under cultivation. But it is also useful to note that this conclusion is
not analytically restrictive because we can always include in the analysis only those plots of
land that generate surplus profit, and hence are under cultivation in a capitalist economy
with landed property.24
We are now ready to introduce the landowner into the analysis and see how this trans-
forms the surplus profit in agriculture into ground-rent and how that is decomposed into
absolute and differential rents (of varieties I and II).
23If the price of the agricultural commodity deviates from p∗ defined in (18), there can be net transfer
of surplus value from agriculture even if there are barriers to capital investment. For instance if there is
such a high demand for the agricultural commodity that its price rises above p∗, then there can be a net
inflow of surplus value into agriculture, as can be seen from the definition of p∗ in (18). On the other
hand if the demand for the agricultural commodity falls to such an extent that its price falls below p∗,
then the agricultural sector might see a net outflow of surplus value. In the extreme case, if the price of
the agricultural commodity falls to the extent that production on the worst plot of land cannot give the
economy-wide average rate of profit, then it will lie fallow. These are interesting cases that can be explored
in future research.
24In the absence of landed property, zero surplus profit on the worst plot of land is compatible with all
plots of land being under cultivation. This is because the capitalist-farmer operating the worst plot of land
is guaranteed the economy-wide average rate of profit. Thus, with the existence of landed property, there is
a chance for some land to remain fallow.
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6.3 Ground-Rent in Agriculture
6.3.1 Existence of Positive Ground-Rent
We have created the apparatus that will allow us to quantify the magnitude of ground-rent
and its three components, given in (7), which we reproduce below for easy reference
GRi = (ci + vi)(ri − α) = DRIi +DRIIi + AR (19)
where
DRIi = (ci + vi)(ri − r1)
is differential rent of the first variety,
DRIIi = [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α)
is differential rent of the second variety, and
AR = (c1 + v1)(r1 − α)
is absolute rent.
Recall that the agricultural economy that we are studying is characterised by the two
conditions given in Assumption 3. Our first task is to prove that this economy produces
positive magnitudes of ground-rent on all plots of agricultural land.
Proposition 6. Suppose the conditions prevailing in the economy is captured by Assump-
tion 3. Then, the total ground-rent appropriated by the landowner of the i-th plot of land,
GRi, is positive. This is because ri − α > 0, where ri is the rate of profit on plot i and α is
the economy-wide average rate of profit.
Proof. By Assumption 3, z1 < f(z2). By Proposition 5, this implies that p
∗ > p˜, i.e. the
price level that arises from zero net flow of surplus value from agriculture, p∗, is larger than
the price that ensures positive surplus profit on the worst plot of land, p˜. Hence, intuitively,
when Assumption 3 holds, each plot of land generates surplus profit.
To see this more formally, let A = p∗ − p˜ > 0. Since the price of the agricultural
commodity is p∗, the rate of profit on the i-th plot, ri is given by
1 + ri =
p∗
ki
=
p˜+ A
ki
=
p˜
ki
+
A
ki
where ki = (ci + vi)/yi is the unit cost of production on plot i. Hence
1 + ri =
p˜
ki
+
A
ki
=
p˜
k1
k1
ki
+
A
ki
k1
ki
.
Let λi = k1/ki for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . By Assumption 1, we know that k1 ≥ k2 ≥ · · · ≥ kN .
Hence λi ≥ 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Thus,
1 + ri = λi
p˜
k1
+ λi
A
k1
. (20)
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By the definition of p˜ as the price level that ensures the economy-wide average rate of profit
on the worst plot of land, we have p˜/k1 = 1 + α, where α is the economy-wide average rate
of profit. Hence,
ri = −1 + λi (1 + α) + λi A
k1
= (λi − 1) + λiα + λi A
k1
.
Hence
ri − α = (λi − 1) (1 + α) + λi A
k1
> 0
because λi ≥ 1, α ≥ 0 and A > 0. This completes the proof.
We can use the results of Proposition 6 to quantify magnitudes of the three components of
ground-rent. To begin, note that since ri > α for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , this means that r1−α > 0.
Hence the absolute rent
AR = (c1 + v1)(r1 − α)
is positive. Turning to differential rent of the first variety,
DRIi = (ci + vi)(ri − r1),
we see that with positive quantities of capital invested on all plots, DRI is also positive
because ri ≥ r1 by Proposition 1. Since no production can take place without labour, the
magnitude of variable capital on plot i is bounded away from zero (while the magnitude of
constant capital is non-negative). Hence ci + vi > 0, which implies that DRIi ≥ 0 (since
ri − r1 ≥ 0 by Proposition 1).
So far in the analysis, we have not imposed any conditions on the magnitudes of the
capital investments on different plots of land. Thus, there are no restrictions on the relative
magnitude of ci + vi in comparison to c1 + v1. This imposes some ambiguity on the sign of
the differential rent of the second variety
DRIIi = [(ci + vi)− (c1 + v1)] (r1 − α).
As long as the total capital invested on plot i is higher than the capital invested on the worst
plot of land, DRII will be positive. But, if the total capital invested on plot i were to fall
below the capital investment on the worst plot, then the magnitude of the differential rent
of the second variety will turn negative. As we have noted earlier, this does not create any
problems for the overall analysis because the sum total of DRI and DRII will always be
positive.
What is the intuition behind the possible negative magnitude of DRII on plot i? Since
plot i is more productive than plot 1 (the worst plot of land), each unit of capital invested
on plot i in excess of the corresponding amount on the worst plot brings in some additional
profit income. If for some reason, that additional investment is not forthcoming on plot i,
or if it falls short of that magnitude, some profit income will be lost.
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Is this a likely scenario? A full answer to this question would require us to develop a
theoretical framework to analyse the decisions that underlie the choice of the exact mag-
nitudes of constant and variable capital on each plot of land. In this paper, I have taken
the magnitudes, ci and vi as given, and a full analysis of their determinants is beyond the
scope of this paper. But I can offer some initial thoughts on this by thinking about the
possible forms of the rental contract. If landowners offer take-it-or-leave-it rental contracts
after calculating the full amount of ground-rent given in (19), then it will be in the interest
of the capitalist-farmer to make the full capital investment, ci+vi, i.e. to make sure that the
extra surplus profit that is represented by DRII is not lost. This is because any decline in
the total surplus profit due to a negative magnitude of DRII will eat into her profit income,
not the rent income of the landowners.25
While we can see easily that the source of differential rent of both varieties arise from
differences with respect to the worst plot of land - DRI from differences in quality, and
DRII from differences in capital invested - it is not completely clear as to what the source
of absolute rent is. How can we think about the source of absolute rent?
Absolute rent arises due to the monopoly of ownership of landed property in the precise
sense that the existence of absolute rent requires collusion (or some other form of collective
action) by the landowners. Why? Absolute rent gets added to the ground-rent of each and
every plot of land. Hence, enforcement of absolute rent has positive externalities for the class
of landowners. If a landowner who owns many plots of land, including the plot of the worst
quality, decides to rent out the plot of worst quality for free, possibly as part of a deal to
rent out other, better, plots of land, every landowner loses revenue, not only this particular
landowner who owns the worst plot. Thus the action of the landowner of the worst plot
of land has implications beyond her own welfare. Hence, to actualise the total benefit of
absolute rent, there needs to be collusion (or some other form of collective action) by the
class of landowners. The class of landowners must come up with some mechanism to ensure
that no landowner allows any, including the worst, plot of land for zero rent. It is in the
interest of the class of landowners to do so because they gain revenue in the form of absolute
rent as a class.
While the existence of absolute rent rests on the possibility of collusion by the class of
landowners, its magnitude is determined by the demand for the agricultural product, and
25The analysis of DRII by Marx is not wholly satisfactory. He adopts a ‘marginal’ perspective in thinking
of DRII as arising from different ‘doses’ of capital on the same plot of land. This is problematic because
the magnitudes of the three types of rent can only be defined meaningfully once we know the amounts of
capital advanced on all plots of land. Hence, the computation is carried out only when all ‘doses’ of capital
investment on different plots of land have been taken into account. A better procedure, in my opinion, is
to consider differences in total (not marginal) capital invested across different plots of land, as I have done
in this paper, i.e. compute rents only after the magnitudes of total capital advanced on each plot of land is
given. My analysis also suggests that there can be neither DRI nor DRII on the worst plot of land. Marx
argues, through an example in chapter 44 (Marx, 1993), that there can be DRII on the worst plot of land.
His calculations, and also Engels’ corrections of those calculations, have a basic conceptual error: the price
of production is not calculated correctly. If it is calculated correctly, the price will be £3 in the second table
on page 873 in Marx (1993), and in that case there will be no rent on the worst plot of land. For details see
Appendix B.
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through that, by the demand for land.26 Note that the magnitude of the absolute rent is
given by (c1 + v1)(r1 − α). While α is the average of profit in the whole economy and is
determined by the factors external to the agricultural sector, r1 is the rate of profit on the
worst plot of land when production is organised by capitalist-farmers who are also owners of
the land. This rate of profit, in turn, is determined by the unit cost of production, k1, and
the price of the agricultural commodity, p∗, as
1 + r1 =
(
p∗
k1
)
.
In our analysis, following Marx, we take the price of the agricultural commodity to be
determined by the condition of zero net flow of surplus value from agriculture. If the price of
the commodity increases above p∗, the surplus profit on the worst plot of land can increase
(through an increase in r1). In the presence of landed property, that will be appropriated
by the whole class of landowners as additional absolute rent.
6.3.2 Summary
This completes the presentation of Marx’s theory of ground-rent in a mathematical form. I
have demonstrated that Marx’s idea that ground-rent is a transformation of surplus profit
generated in agriculture can be rigorously established and that it can be decomposed into
three components: absolute rent, differential rent of the first variety, and differential rent of
the second variety. In particular, I have demonstrated in Proposition 6 that under Marx’s
assumption about the determination of the price of the agricultural commodity - zero net
flow of surplus value from agriculture - the agricultural sector will generate positive amounts
of ground-rent on each plot of land as long as two conditions are satisfied: (a) there is a
hierarchy in the quality of the plots of land, as captured by Assumption 1, and (b) the
organic composition of capital in agriculture is sufficiently lower than its economy-wide
counterpart, as captured by Assumption 3. Given the capital invested on each plot of land
and the economy-wide average rate of profit, we can then compute the exact magnitude of
the ground-rent using (19).
26“Even though landed property can drive the price of agricultural products above their price of production,
it does not depend on this, but rather on the general state of the market” (Marx, 1993, pp. 898).
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, I discuss an example that Marx used at the beginning of Chapter 44 to
demonstrate that DRII can arise on the worst plot of land. I show that Marx’s analysis has
problems, and that, if those problems are addressed, DRII will be zero on the worst plot
of land, as I have argued in this paper. Since the focus is on differential rent, the analysis
abstracts from absolute rent.
Initial Situation
The initial situation is depicted in panel A in Table 4. Marx specifies that the price of
production “refers to the sum of capital advanced plus 20 percent profit” (Marx, 1993, pp.
873). Thus, on plot A, the price of production of 3 implies that the capital advanced is 2.5
(=3/1.2). Similarly, on plots B, C and D, the amount of capital advanced is 5 (= 6/1.2).
We would like to work out the details of the rental agreement that would arise in the
initial situation. To do so we would need to know the market price of the commodity. How is
the market price determined? It is determined by the principle that the capital advanced on
the worst plot of land earns the average rate of profit (because there is no absolute rent). But
what is the worst plot of land? It is the land which has the highest unit cost of production,
i.e. it is the plot on which each unit of output costs the highest amount of labour time to
produce.
The unit cost of production on plots A, B, C and D are 2.5, 1.43, 0.91 and 0.67, respec-
tively. Since plot A has the highest unit cost of production, the market price gets determined
by the condition of production on plot A. Hence, the market price is 3 = 2.5 ∗ 1.2. Once
we know the market price, we are able to compute the money rent in the last column of
panel A in Table 4. Hence, the rental agreement on plot A, B, C and D involves money
rent payments of 0, 4.5, 10.5 and 16.5. Capitalist-farmers must pay these amounts to use the
plots of land for capitalist commodity production.
Increase in Demand
Suppose there is an increase in demand for the agricultural commodity. The capitalist-
farmer on plot B, having received this signal of increased demand, is deciding whether to
increase his production by another unit.27 Suppose he knows that to increase production
by another unit would involve a “production cost” of 3.5 (which implies a capital advance
of 3.5/1.2). The question is whether the capitalist-farmer on plot B has any incentive to
undertake the additional investment and increase production by another unit. If there is an
additional investment of 3.5/1.2 on plot B, the capitalist-farmer’s total capital advanced will
be 7.92 = (5 + 3.5/1.2). If the price of the commodity remains at 3 (the situation depicted
in panel A, Table 4), then the capitalist-farmer on plot B will earn 13.64% ((9− 7.92/7.92))
27Marx only considers the case of an increase in production on plot B. I follow him and do not consider
other possibilities.
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Table 4: Differential Rent on the Worst Plot of Landa
Type of Price of Units of Market Rent
Land Production Output Price
Panel A
Original Situation:
A 3 1 3 0
B 6 3.5 3 4.5
C 6 5.5 3 10.5
D 6 7.5 3 16.5
Panel B
Final Situation:
A 3 1 3.5 0.5
B 9.5 4.5 3.5 6.25
C 6 5.5 3.5 13.25
D 6 7.5 3.5 20.25
Panel C
Corrected Final Situation:
A 3 1 3 0
B 9.5 4.5 3 4
C 6 5.5 3 10.5
D 6 7.5 3 16.5
a This table reprdocues, panel A and panel B, the two tables on
page 873 in Marx (1993). In panel C, I give the corrected version
of the the situation depicted in panel B.
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rate of profit. Since this is lower than the economy-wide average rate of profit of 20%, the
capitalist does not have the incentive to undertake the additional investment.
If the additional investment is not forthcoming on plot B, there will be a shortfall of
supply. This will increase the price of the agricultural commodity. Marx probably thinks
that the price will need to increase to the extent that will ensure the additional production
on plot B. Let us follow Marx in this line of reasoning and ask: what will be the required
level of the price of the agricultural commodity to ensure the additional investment on plot
B? Marx’s answer is 3.5. How did he arrive at this answer? Marx argues that the price of
the commodity will be determined by the “production cost” (capital advanced plus profit)
of the marginal unit of capital. In his example, the “production cost” associated with the
additional dose of capital is 3.5, so that the “capital advance” needed to produce another
unit of the commodity on plot B is 2.92 (= 3.5/1.2). “In this case,”, argues Marx, “3.5 would
be the governing price for the total production.” (Marx, 1993, pp. 872). He calculates the
surplus profit, and therefore the rent, on the basis of this price. This is depicted in panel B
in Table 4. But Marx’s calculations are incorrect.
Suppose the price of the agricultural commodity is p. On plot B, the output is 4.5 units,
and the capital advanced in 7.92. Since the capitalist-farmer has already paid the rent of
4.5, this is an additional component of cost for her to consider. Hence, the price that will
ensure a 20% rate of profit on the total capital advanced on plot B must satisfy the following
equation:
0.2 =
4.5p− 7.92− 4.5
7.92
.
This computation shows that p = 3.11, i.e. the price must be 3.11 to ensure a ensure a 20%
rate of profit on the total capital advanced on plot B. This is exactly the price Engels came
up with when he corrected Marx’s calculations (Marx, 1993, pp. 874).
Thus, if the price of the agricultural commodity increases to 3.11, it will justify the
additional investment on plot B because this will ensure 20% rate of profit on the total capital
invested. Marx is incorrect in thinking that the price needs to increase to 3.5. Hence, the
additional calculations about money rent, shown in panel B in Table 4, are also incorrect.28
In fact there would be no additional money rent because they have already been agreed upon
and paid. What Marx probably has in mind is the terms of the new rental agreement that
would arise after the existing ones expire, at which point landowners would probably factor
in the new level of demand into their computations of ground rent. We will see soon that
he is wrong on that count too. But before we do so, it is important to reiterate that Engel’s
calculations are indeed correct as far as it addresses the following question: what must the
level of the price be for capitalist-farmer B to produce an additional unit of output after the
rental agreement has been worked out? But this does not still answer the question relevant
for our discussion: how will this impact the next round of rental agreement?
28In Appendix II, Fine (2006) repeats Marx’s mistake because he thinks that “Marx demonstrated that
the selling price must rise at least to 3 12 to induce the additional capital on B.” In advancing this argument,
he criticizes Engels. But, the above calculations demonstrate that his criticism of Engels is not valid.
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New Rental Agreement
When the new rental agreement is being negotiated, the situation will be as depicted in panel
C in Table 4. This means that the cost of production and the associated outputs on each
plot of land is exactly as appeared in panel B in Table 4. To determine the rent, we need
to find the market price of the commodity. To do so we need to apply the same principle
that we applied in panel A in Table 4: the market price is determined by the principle that
the capital advanced on the worst plot of land get the average rate of profit. Which is the
worst plot in the new situation? To identify the worst plot of land, let us compute the cost
of producing one unit of the commodity on the plots.
For plot A: unit cost of production is 2.5 (= 2.5/1). For plot B: the unit cost of production
is 1.76 (=(9.5/1.2)/4.5) because the total capital advanced is 9.5/1.2 and the plot produces
4.5 units of output. It can be easily seen that the unit cost of production on plots C and D
are even lower. Plot A remains the worst plot. Hence the market price remains the same
as before: 3. The calculation of money rent with this “corrected” price is given in panel C
in Table 4. There is zero differential rent on plot A, the worst plot. Thus, Marx was wrong
in asserting that, within the framework of analysis that he developed for ground-rent, there
can be positive differential rent on the worst plot of land.
What is the source of Marx’s errors? The main problem is that Marx does not consistently
follow the logic of his own analysis. If there is an increase in demand after the rental
agreement has been fixed, it can have no effect on the magnitude of rent because it has already
been paid or at the least agreed upon. Of course, if the increase is relatively permanent, it
will be taken into account when new rental agreements are worked out. But in that case
too, it will be possible to compute the magnitudes of rent on each plot only when we know
the capital advanced and output produced on each plot of land. Only with this information
will be able to identify the worst, and hence benchmark, plot of land. Since absolute rent
is zero, by assumption, the price of the agricultural commodity will be such that the worst
plot of land will only earn the average rate of profit. Once the price of the commodity
is determined, that will allow us to compute the magnitude of rent on all plots of land.
Marx gives up this principle when he considers the case of an increase in the demand for
agricultural commodities. That is the source of his error.
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